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The general purpose of tax treaties is to implement the 
consensus underlying the international tax regime by shifting 
the right to tax passive income from the source to the residence 
country, and by limiting the ability of source countries to tax 
active income to income attributable to a permanent 
establishment.3 Article 7 of the OECD MC implements this 
latter function by stating that a contracting state may not tax 
business profits arising therein unless they are attributable to a 
permanent establishment (PE, as defined in Article 5 OECD 
MC). 
 
A priori, one would expect Article 7 not to play a very 
important role in modern treaty practice, because most cross-
border business profits are earned by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), and MNEs generally operate in host countries via 
subsidiaries, rather than via branches. Thus, one would expect 
that most practical issues in the allocation of business income 
would be governed by Article 9 OECD MC, which addresses 
parent-subsidiary transactions, rather than by Article 7. 
 
                                                 
1 Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LLM Program, the University of 
Michigan. Parts of this paper are based on Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A 
Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment (with K. Clausing), The Hamilton Project, Brookings 
Institution (2007); also in 2007 TNT 114-38 (June 13, 2007). 
2 Miller and Mintz Professor of Economics, Reed College. 
3 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the 
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However, a series of recent developments have led to a renewed 
emphasis on Article 7, as evidenced by the publication last year 
of a major OECD report on the attribution of profits to 
permanent establishments.4 These developments include the rise 
of electronic commerce, which has made it easier to sell 
products into countries without using a subsidiary or a PE; the 
increasing importance of financial services and global trading, 
which is frequently conducted via branches; and the 
proliferation of tax planning using PE structures, such as U.S. 
planning relying on check the box. In addition, various countries 
have taken aggressive approaches to finding that a PE exists, 
such as recent cases that find that a subsidiary is in fact a 
dependent agent PE.5
 
In reaction to these developments, the OECD Report advocates 
an “authorised OECD approach” to the interpretation of Article 
7, which incorporates by analogy the concepts developed under 
Article 9 and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines: “the authorised 
OECD approach is that the profits to be attributed to are the 
profits that the PE would have earned at arm’s length if it were a 
legally distinct and separate enterprise performing the same or 
similar functions under the same or similar conditions, 
determined by applying the arm’s length principle under Article 
7(2).”6  
 
As Richard Vann has pointed out, the problem with this 
approach is that it assumes that the Article 9/Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are working well, and therefore treating PEs as if 
they were subsidiaries would solve the problem.7 However, an 
                                                 
4 OECD, Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (December 2006) (the “OECD 
Report”). 
5 Jean Francois LeGall, “When Is a Subsidiary a Permanent Establishment of Its Parent?”  Tillinghast 
Lecture, New York University 2006 (forthcoming in Tax Law Review).
6 OECD Report, 12. 
7 Richard Vann, Problems in the International Division of the Business Income Tax Base (2007); Richard 
Vann, Tax Treaties: The Secret Agent’s Secrets, British Tax Rev. 345 (2006).  
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extensive literature has established that the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are not working well, and are in need of reform.8  
Thus, we believe that the Article 7 problem must be 
reconsidered from first principles. 
 
2. What Is The Right Way to Tax MNEs at Source? 
 
The OECD Report states that its recommendation “was not 
constrained by either the original intent or by the historical 
practice and interpretation of Article 7.”9 Moreover, the Report 
recommends a redrafting of both the Article itself and the 
Commentary.10 Given this, it seems appropriate to begin by 
asking: If we were working on a clean slate, what would be the 
best way to tax MNEs at source in the light of 21st century 
business practices? 
 
The beginning point has to be that a modern MNE does not 
operate as if its constituent units, either subsidiaries or branches, 
deal with each other as if they were separate enterprises. 
Instead, a modern MNE is generally a single, unified enterprise, 
managed from a central location by managers who are 
responsible to their shareholders for the results of the MNE as a 
whole. 
 
The current approach to taxing MNEs at source is based on 
separate accounting (SA), or treating each entity within the 
MNE as a separate taxpayer. This approach is problematic for a 
variety of reasons. First, the system is not suited to the global 
nature of international business.  In particular, international 
production processes make the SA system of assigning profit to 
specific geographic destinations inherently arbitrary.  Further, 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. 
International Taxation, 15 Virginia Tax Rev. 89 (1995), updated version in 9 Finance and Tax L. Rev. 310 
(2006).  
9 OECD Report, 8. 
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the very nature of multinational firm operations generates 
additional profit over what would occur with strictly arm’s-
length transactions between unaffiliated entities. Theories of 
multinational firms emphasize that they arise in part due to 
organizational and internalization advantages relative to purely 
domestic firms; such advantages imply that profit is generated 
in part by internalizing transactions within the firm.  Thus, with 
firms that are truly integrated across borders, holding related 
entities to an “arm’s-length” standard for the pricing of 
intracompany transactions does not make sense, nor does 
allocating income and expenses on a country-by-country basis.   
 
Also, the current system is based on an artificial distinction 
among legal entities.  For example, companies are taxed 
differently based on whether they employ subsidiaries or 
branches;  as one example, deferral of taxation on unrepatriated 
profits is allowed for the former but not the later.  Recently, 
there has been an increasingly common use of hybrid entities 
(treated as subsidiaries by one country and branches by another) 
to achieve double non-taxation. 
 
Another related problem is that the current system is based on 
an increasingly artificial distinction between MNEs whose 
parent is incorporated in a residence country and those whose 
parent is incorporated elsewhere. The former, but not the latter, 
are frequently subject to world-wide taxation with its attendant 
complexities (primarily the foreign tax credit and CFC rules). 
But in today’s world, this distinction is less and less meaningful 
as the sources of capital, location of R&D, location of 
production, and location of distribution of MNEs become 
increasingly globalized. The current distinction has led to a 
spate of inversion transactions, in which US-based MNEs 
formally shift the location of incorporation of their parent 
offshore without changing the location of any of their real 
business activities.  
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Second, the current system of international taxation creates an 
artificial tax incentive to locate profits in low-tax countries, both 
by locating real economic activities in such countries and by 
shifting profits toward more lightly taxed locations.  It is 
apparent that U.S. multinational firms, for example, book 
disproportionate amounts of profit in low-tax locations. Figure 1 
shows the top ten profit locations for U.S. multinational firms in 
2003, based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.) profits earned 
in each location.  While some of the countries are places with a 
large U.S. presence in terms of economic activity (the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Japan), seven of the top-ten profit 
countries are locations with very low effective tax rates. 
 
The literature has consistently found that multinational firms are 
sensitive to corporate tax rate differences across countries in 
their financial decisions. Estimates from the literature suggest 
that the tax base responds to changes in the corporate tax rate 
with an average semi-elasticity of about -2;  thus, countries with 
high corporate tax rates are likely to gain revenue by lowering 
their tax rate.11  One recent study suggests that corporate 
income tax revenues in the United States were approximately 
35% lower due to income shifting in 2002.12
 
Third, the current system is absurdly complex.  As Taylor notes, 
observers have described the system as “a cumbersome creation 
of stupefying complexity” with “rules that lack coherence and 
often work at cross purposes.”13   Altshuler and Ackerman note 
that observers testifying before the President’s Advisory Panel 
                                                 
11 See Ruud A. de Mooij, “Will Corporate Income Taxation Survive?”  153 De Economist 277 (2005), 
 for an overview of this literature. 
12 This estimate is from Kimberly A Clausing, “Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and U.S. Government 
Revenue,” Working paper (2007). The calculation is based on a regression of U.S. multinational firm 
affiliate profit rates on tax rate differences across countries.   
13 Willard Taylor, Testimony before the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. March 31, 
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on Federal Tax Reform found the system “deeply, deeply 
flawed”, noting that “It is difficult to overstate the crisis in the 
administration of the international tax system of the United 
States.”14   
 
A large part of this crisis results from applying the current 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The current regime consumes a 
disproportionate share of both IRS and private sector resources.  
For example, several recent Ernst and Young surveys of 
multinational firms have concluded that “transfer pricing 
continues to be, and will remain, the most important 
international tax issue facing MNEs”.15 70% of their 
respondents feel that transfer pricing documentation has become 
more important in recent years, and 63% of respondents report 
transfer pricing audit activity in the previous three years.   
 
Opinions in transfer pricing cases run to hundreds of pages 
each, and litigation involves billions of dollars in proposed 
deficiencies, such as the recently settled Glaxo case ($9 billion 
in proposed deficiency, settled for $3.4 billion) or the Aramco 
advantage case (litigated and lost by the IRS, which asserted 
deficiencies of over $9 billion).  There is no indication that the 
1994 regulations under IRC section 482 have abated this 
trend.16 While there have been fewer decided cases than under 
the pre-1994 regulations, this is because both taxpayers and the 
IRS have been devoting enormous resources to settling these 
controversies in the appeals process, in litigation or through 
advance pricing agreements, while both sides have been wary of 
losing a major court case.  
 
                                                 
14 Rosanne Altshuler and Jonathan Ackerman, “International Aspects of Recommendations from the 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform.”  International Tax Policy Forum Presentation,  2 
December 2005. 
15 Ernst and Young, “2005-2006 Global Transfer Pricing Surveys.”    Available on-line at 
www.ey.com/transferpricingsurvey;  accessed Jan 4, 2007. 
16 Avi-Yonah, supra. 
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The contemporaneous documentation rule adopted by Congress, 
which requires taxpayers to develop documentation of their 
transfer pricing methods at the time the transactions are 
undertaken rather than when they are challenged on audit, as 
well as the complexity of the new SA methods (such as the 
Comparable Profits Method, or CPM), have led the major 
accounting firms to develop huge databases and expertise in 
preparing transfer pricing documentation for clients. This 
imposes large costs on major US multinational corporations.17  
Meanwhile, small and medium businesses, which cannot afford 
the major accounting firms, are left to fend for themselves and 
are frequently targeted for audits in which the IRS can employ 
more sophisticated methods than the taxpayer because only the 
IRS and the large accounting firms have the necessary data to 
apply CPM. Thus, while the IRS continues to lose transfer 
prices cases against major MNEs under the 1994 regulations 
(e.g., Xilinx) or has to settle for less than half the proposed 
deficiency in Glaxo, it is able to win cases against small and 
medium firms on the basis of superior resources, rather than 
greater substantive justification of its position.  
 
Thus, we believe that if we were designing the system from 
scratch, we would adopt as our starting point not SA, but 
formulary apportionment (FA). FA has several advantages over 
SA. First, FA aligns the international corporate tax system with 
the reality of a truly global world economy.  In a world where 
most major corporations are MNEs, where 70% of U.S. 
international trade is done by multinational firms, and where 
many opportunities for tax avoidance have an international 
dimension, the current system of corporate taxation is obsolete.   
In particular, SA systems treat each affiliate of a multinational 
firm as a distinct entity with its own costs and incomes.  
                                                 
17 Michael C. Durst and Robert E. Culbertson, “Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective Methods and 
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Allocating income and expenses across countries is both 
complex and conceptually unsatisfactory, given that worldwide 
income is generated by interactions between affiliates across 
countries.  Multinational firms exist in large part because these 
interactions generate more income than would separate 
domestic firms interacting at arms-length;  thus, requiring firms 
to allocate this additional income among domestic tax bases is 
necessarily artificial and arbitrary, because it would by 
definition disappear if the related entities operated at arm’s 
length.  Further, such allocation generates ample opportunity for 
multinational firms to reduce worldwide tax burdens by shifting 
income to more lightly taxed jurisdictions. 
 
Under a FA system, tax liabilities are instead based on a 
multinational firm’s global income, and the share that is taxed 
by the national jurisdiction depends on the fraction of a firm’s 
economic activity that occurs in a particular country.18 Thus, 
while a truly precise definition and measurement of economic 
value is likely unattainable, FA provides a reasonable, 
administrable, and conceptually satisfying compromise that 
suits the nature of the global economy.  Further, a FA system 
does not create an artificial legal distinction among types of 
firms, and whether multinational entities are organized as 
subsidiaries, branches, or hybrid entities. Nor does an FA 
system rely on an artificial distinction between MNEs whose 
parent is incorporated in a particular residence jurisdiction and 
MNEs whose parent is incorporated elsewhere. 
  
The second advantage associated with the proposal is that it 
eliminates the tax incentive to shift income to low-tax countries.  
As income shifting incentives are an important part of the 
overall tax incentive for locating operations in low-tax 
countries, removing this incentive will also result in less tax-
                                                 
18 How this fraction is determined depends on the formula, discussed below. 
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distorted decisions regarding the location of economic activity.  
Under FA, firms are taxed based on their global income.  Thus, 
accounting for the income earned in each country is no longer 
necessary, and there is no way to lighten global tax burdens by 
manipulating this accounting for tax purposes.   
 
Under FA, there is no reason for the sort of profit distortions 
that are so clearly visible in Figure 1.  In addition, when firms 
consider the tax advantages associated with operating in low-tax 
countries, these advantages will be based simply on the lower 
tax associated with their operations in such countries, rather 
than additional advantages conferred due to the fact that real 
operations in low-tax countries facilitate tax avoidance.  Thus, 
the adoption of FA should vastly reduce tax distortions to 
multinational firm decision making.   
 
Such changes in the taxation of international income ultimately 
help governments set their tax policies more independently.  
The wishes of voters in each government influence the ideal 
size of government, required revenue needs, and the allocation 
of the tax burden among subgroups within society.  Under FA, 
governments would be able to choose their own corporate tax 
rate based on their assessment of these sorts of policy goals, 
rather than the pressures of tax competition for an increasingly 
mobile capital income tax base. 
 
The third advantage associated with the proposal is the massive 
increase in simplicity that this would enable for the international 
tax system.  To determine tax liability, there would be no need 
to allocate income or expenses among countries, resulting in far 
lighter compliance burden for firms.  CFC rules and the foreign 
tax credit, which are both hugely complicated and a major 
source of transaction costs for MNEs, are no longer necessary, 
since there is no deferral under this system (which is essentially 
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Further, the likely administrative savings from abandoning the 
current cumbersome transfer pricing regime are huge. By 
contrast to the current regime, FA is relatively simple since all 
that it requires is (1) establishing which businesses are unitary 
and (2) establishing destination of arm’s-length sales of goods 
or services.19 Once these two elements are established, the 
resulting formula permits both taxpayers and the tax authorities 
to determine to correct tax liability to each jurisdiction that uses 
FA. This means that there is no longer a need to allocate or 
apportion expenses (a source of major complexity in the current 
rules, as the US 861 regulations indicate), because all a business 
needs is to calculate its world-wide net income (worldwide 
gross income minus worldwide expenses). This net income is 
then allocated to various jurisdictions based on a single formula, 
the tax rate of each jurisdiction is applied to the allocated 
income, and the tax is paid. 
  
For small and medium businesses in particular, FA results in 
major cost savings as well as the likelihood of paying less tax 
(since such businesses are rarely in a position to take on the IRS 
under SA).  For major multinational firms, FA also offers the 
prospect of avoiding the costs of contemporaneous 
documentation, and while some firms may pay more tax than 
under SA, many would welcome the opportunity of paying a 
single, low rate to each jurisdiction they do business in 
(especially if the adoption of FA is coupled with a reduction in 
the corporate rate), instead of having to cope with the 
complexities and costs of SA.   
 
3. Progress Toward FA, 1995-2007 
 
                                                 
19 For a specific statutory proposal on how to deal with these issues in the context of a sales-based formula 
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But, it will be argued right away, we are not working on a clean 
slate: SA is the international norm, and FA is anathema to the 
OECD. Thus, we must work within the confines of SA, 
whatever its disadvantages. 
 
But is this really still true? We would argue that developments 
since the adoption of the revised Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 
1995 have made a consensual shift to FA much more likely. 
 
First, one needs to recognize that the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines themselves represent a crucial step forward because 
they adopt two methods (TNMM and profit split) that are not 
based on strictly defined comparables. As we have argued 
elsewhere, once strict comparability is abandoned, the term 
“arm’s length” can be applied to any transfer pricing method, 
including FA.20 That is because in the absence of comparables, 
no one can know what unrelated parties would have done, and 
thus any result is an arm’s length result. Thus, as stated in 1993 
by senior officials of the United States Treasury, the United 
Kingdom Inland Revenue, the Fiscal Affairs Division of the 
OECD and the Japanese National Tax Administration: 
 
“[T]he arm's length principle and formulary apportionment 
should not be seen as polar extremes; rather, they should be 
viewed as part of a continuum of methods ranging from CUP 
to predetermined formulas. It is not clear where the arm's 
length principle ceases and formulary apportionment begins, 
and it is counterproductive and unimportant to attempt to 
apply labels to the methods.”21  
 
Second, recent developments in the EU (which now represents a 
majority in the OECD) have cast doubt about the opposition of 
                                                 
20 Avi-Yonah, Rise and Fall, supra. 
21 Brian J. Arnold and Thomas E. McDonnell, Report on the Invitational Conference on Transfer Pricing: 
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certain traditional opponents of FA to that method. In particular, 
the work on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), which is scheduled to lead to a concrete proposal by 
2010, is based on FA.22 Of course, the CCCTB proposal faces 
difficult political obstacles, is only intended to apply within the 
EU, and is currently voluntary. However, the work so far shows 
that a significant portion of EU Member States, including some 
traditional opponents of FA like Germany, now believe that FA 
is the direction of future development. 
 
Third, the U.S. has been at the forefront of adopting formulary 
methods, both in the context of allocating expenses (e.g., the 
interest allocation regulations) and income (e.g., the global 
trading regulations). Moreover, the U.S. approach to transfer 
pricing has since 1995 been closer in practice to FA (the CPM is 
more formulary than TNMM, and the US profit split is 
equivalent in practice to FA with the location of R&D 
determining the formula). Recent policy work by the Hamilton 
Project, the major Democratic think tank for the 2008 election, 
has supported FA, which has gained adherents such as former 
Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Larry Summers.23  
 
Thus, we believe that if the OECD were to shift course and start 
working on an FA proposal for Article 7, this could have the 
support of both the US and a large number of EU members. 
That is particularly true if the proposal could be implemented 
within the existing language of Article 7.  
 
4. Is FA Compatible with the OECD MC? 
 
Some have argued that tax treaties will need modification with 
adoption of FA.  However, it is not clear to us that existing tax 
                                                 
22 European Commission, The Mechanism for Sharing the CCCTB, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en (2006); 
Christoph Spengel, The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (2007). 
23 See Avi-Yonah and Clausing, supra. 
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treaties will have to be renegotiated. Transfer pricing is 
currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which assumes 
the SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial 
relations between associated enterprises. If FA were adopted, 
Article 9 would become irrelevant in those situations to which 
FA applies (i.e., where a unitary business is found to exist) 
because FA ignores the transactions between related parties, and 
treats them instead as part of a single enterprise. 
 
Instead, FA would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7), 
“[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting 
State controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of 
the other Contracting State … shall not constitute either 
company a permanent establishment of the other.” However, it 
is well established that a dependent agent can be a permanent 
establishment (see Art. 5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent 
is based on whether the principal exercises legal and economic 
control over the agent. “An agent that is subject to detailed 
instructions regarding the conduct of its operations or 
comprehensive control by the enterprise is not legally 
independent.”24
 
In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a 
unitary business, a strong argument can be made that the parent 
of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control over the 
operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries 
bear no real risk of loss and acquire goods and services 
exclusively or near exclusively from the parent or other related 
corporations. In that case, the subsidiaries should be regarded as 
dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact made 
with increasing frequency in both developed and developing 
countries.25
                                                 
24 U.S. Treasury. Technical Explanation of United States Model Income Tax Convention. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, Art. 5(6) (2006).  
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If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the 
treaties requires the attribution of the same profits to the 
subsidiary “that it might be expected to make if it were a 
distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the same or 
similar activities under the same or similar conditions.”  
Arguably, the application of FA satisfies this arm’s length 
condition because in the absence of precise comparables (which 
almost never exist) it is not possible to determine exactly what 
profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.  
 
When the US adopted CPM and profit split in the 1994 transfer 
pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating 
the treaties because these methods did not rely on exact 
comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these 
objections soon subsided, and even the OECD endorsed similar 
methods in its transfer pricing guidelines. The US always 
maintained that both CPM and profit split satisfy the arm’s 
length standard despite the lack of precise comparables (and in 
the case of profit split, using no comparables at all to allocate 
any residual profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the 
“super-royalty rule” of IRC sec. 482 (which requires royalties to 
be “commensurate with the income” from an intangible, and 
therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the 
arm’s length standard, even though no comparables can be 
found to show that such adjustments are ever made by unrelated 
parties. 
 
In addition, if OECD members were to adopt FA, they could 
argue that this is compatible with the language of OECD MC 
Art. 7(4): 
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“Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to 
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent 
establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total 
profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in 
paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from 
determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment 
as may be necessary; the method of apportionment adopted 
shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance 
with the principles contained in this Article.” 
 
This language is found in many existing tax treaties based on 
the OECD and UN models, and it can be used by OECD 
members as a basis for applying FA under their domestic law, 
without resort to a treaty override. 
 
5. Conclusion: Toward a New Mechanism for Taxing Business 
Profits at Source 
 
We thus believe that rather than finalizing the current OECD 
Report, the OECD should abandon its effort to apply obsolete 
Article 9 SA concepts to PEs. Instead, it should work on 
designing a workable FA approach within the context of current 
Article 7. Article 9 can be left to apply only to those situations 
in which a business is not unitary. 
 
Adopting FA requires resolution of difficult issues. First, the 
OECD would need to define a unitary business. We believe that 
relying on the current treaty language of legal and economic 
dependency, plus a test based on control (>50% of vote or 
value) and a de minimis threshold of related party transactions 
would be adequate in most cases. 
 
Second, the common tax base to be apportioned needs to be 
agreed on. The EU work on the CCCTB and progress toward 
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Third and most importantly, the formula needs to be 
determined. We have advocated a sales-based formula because 
of the likelihood that countries can adopt it without 
coordination, like destination basis for VAT.26 Sales are also 
less susceptible to tax-motivated shifting than assets or payroll 
(the other elements in the traditional U.S. state formula). But 
within the OECD there is scope for negotiations on other 
formulas, including functional analysis based on personnel, 
assets and sales (as in the global trading regulations and the 
OECD Report). 
 
Finally, we believe that in the future the text of Article 5 needs 
to be revamped so that it fits modern business realities. In 
particular, we would advocate a numerical threshold, rather than 
one based on a physical PE.27 But that is a topic for another day. 
                                                 
26 See Avi-Yonah and Clausing, supra. 
27 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997); 
Brian J. Arnold, Threshold requirements for taxing profits under tax treaties, in Brian Arnold, Jacques 
Sasseville and Eric Zolt (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003); Dale Pinto, 
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Figure 1:  Where Were the Profits in 2003?  




































































U.K. Islands 1.3% 
Japan 36.9% 
 
Notes: In 2003,  majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms earned $326 
billion of net income.  This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-U.S.) 
total net income occurring in each of the top-10 income countries. Thus, each 
percentage point translates into approximately $3.3 billion of net income.  Effective 
tax rates are calculated as foreign income taxes paid relative to net (pre-tax) income.  
Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web page;  2003 is the most 
recent year with revised data available.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis conducts 
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